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The Development of Inductive Reasoning: Cross-
sectional Assessments in an Educational Context
Beno0 Csapó
Attila József University, Szeged, Hungary
This paper links two research paradigms, one that studies attributes and
mechanisms of inductive reasoning and one that tries to make school learning
more meaningful and knowledge better understood and more easily applied,
by examining how inductive reasoning develops during a signi cant age range
of schooling and how it relates to certain other cognitive functions. Six tests of
inductive reasoning (number analogies, verbal analogies, number series,
verbal series, coding, exclusion) were devised and administered to 3rd, 5th,
7th, 9th, and 11th grade students (N . 2000). Data were also collected on
students’ school achievement, and a test of applied science knowledge was
administered to the two oldest samples. The comparison of age groups
indicated that the fastest development of inductive reasoning took place
between the 5th and 9th grades; a major development was detected before the
5th grade, and only modest changes were found after the 9th grade. Regression
analysis models indicated that inductive reasoning accounted for around twice
as large a proportion of the results of the test that measured the applied science
knowledge in everyday situations as did school knowledge (represented  by
school grades).
Inductive reasoning is considered a basic component of thinking, and it is
one of the most broadly studied procedures of cognition. The inductive
method, or teaching by examples, is one of the oldest methods of instruction.
In addition, induction, or rather its role in generating scientic knowledge, is
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one of the most enduring problems of philosophy. Although recent cognitive
research has resulted in a vast body of new information about inductive
reasoning and has rened our understanding of its functioning, school
instruction still seems far from using it effectively and several problems can
be attributed to this scanty attention paid to the role of induction in learning.
In this study we examine how inductive reasoning develops during a
signicant age range of schooling and how it relates to certain other
cognitive functions. We try to estimate its contributions to school
achievement and to the application of knowledge in schools today.
The centrality of inductive reasoning can best be demonstrated by the fact
that many research schools have dealt with it, in the frameworks of several
research paradigms, and it has been discussed in relationship to most of the
higher-order  cognitive skills. The mechanism of rule induction was central in
some early information-processing models of problem-solving (Egan &
Greeno, 1974; Simon, 1974). Inductive reasoning, or its components, have
often been related to or identi ed with general intelligence. For example,
Sternberg (1977) discussed analogical reasoning in this context, and several
intelligence tests contained inductive reasoning tasks or consisted
exclusively of them. Various conceptualisations have interpreted inductive
reasoning by reformulating the classical inductive-deductive categorisation
and have described it by contrasting or comparing it with deductive
reasoning (Ennis, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1988; Shy, 1988; Sternberg, 1986). In
these systems and taxonomies, inductive reasoning appears as one of the
components of critical thinking (Ennis, 1987) or is discussed in a framework
that also accommodates creativity (together with associations, computing,
and deduction; see Johnson-Laird, 1988). Inductive reasoning may be one of
the mechanisms of hypothesis generating and hypothesis testing (Gilhooly,
1982), as well as a means of concept development (Egan & Greeno, 1974;
Gelman & Markman, 1987; Markman, 1989).
The signicance of induction in the acquisition of personal knowledge is
accentuated by the diversity of research on inductive reasoning carried out
in close relationship with learning. Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard
(1986) presented a comprehensive theoretical analysis and a number of
studies have examined its specic functions. Depending on the paradigm
and approach, inductive reasoning is interpreted as one of the basic learning
abilities (Pellegrino & Glaser, 1982), or learning skills (Ropo, 1987); whereas
some recent works use inductive tasks to measure learning potential (Resing,
1993; Tissink, Hamers, & van Luit, 1993).
Inductive thinking, especially analogical reasoning, is a means of
transfer—applying knowledge acquired in one context in new situations.
Contemporary cognitive research has revealed that the majority of our
knowledge is content-bound or domain-speci c; it does not transfer easily
from one eld to another. Wason’s famous card task (1968) inspired
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numerous studies that proved that knowledge demonstrated in one problem
does not transfer automatically even into a structurally isomorphic problem.
On the other hand, transfer obviously does exist, and analogies are the most
frequently studied forms of transfer (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak, 1985).
Experiments aiming directly at transfer mechanisms (Klauer, 1989; Phye,
1989, 1990) or inductive reasoning in general (Klauer, 1990) have shown that
inductive reasoning can be improved. Thus, through improving inductive
reasoning we can also improve learning.
A large number of studies have examined the structure of inductive
reasoning by using various types of tasks (most frequently analogies, series
completions, and classications) with different contents (e.g. verbal, gural).
Most of the data sets were highly intercorrelated; for example, the study by
Sternberg and Gardner (1983, p. 106) resulted in the conclusion that: “. . .
highly similar processes are used on the various tasks, but these processes
operate on different knowledge stores and possibly different forms of
representation for the different contents.” These examinations were carried
out under different circumstances (mainly in laboratory conditions) and
different techniques of data collection (e.g. measuring response time) were
used than our planned measurements in educational contexts. Therefore, it
seemed plausible: (1) to devise a test battery of different types of inductive
tasks with various contents; (2) to examine whether they highly
intercorrelate; and if so (3), to represent inductive reasoning with one single
variable for further computations.
The concepts just highlighted cover nearly every relevant cognitive aspect
of school instruction, and as they relate to educational applications, the
results of previous research have great value. Many of them have shaped our
understanding. However, without further eld work they can hardly be
applied in real-life instructional situations. Others, especially some results of
the most recent research, can easily nd their way into instructional
applications.
The paradigm shift formulated by Kuhn (1989, p. 261) can also be
observed in research on inductive reasoning:
It was not long ago that relevant research was strictly second class. Research
that related directly to real world issues and problems was labeled “applied”,
and strongly implied by that label was lack of rigor. Today, in contrast, we are
concerned that our research be relevant. Competently designed and executed
research programs are vulnerable to criticism and dismissal on the grounds of
irrelevance, and the priority of our concerns regarding internal versus external
validity has largely been reversed.
Several recent works clearly mark this new orientation (e.g. Halford &
Boulton-Lewis, 1992; Klauer, 1990; Resing, 1993; Tissink et al., 1993).
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Use of knowledge has become an increasingly important eld of research
that approaches the problem of meaningful learning from another direction:
The improvement of school instruction. Several studies have indicated that
the type of achievement schools acknowledge and praise may be different
from the type that can be used in a practical context. For example, Nunes,
Schliemann, and Carraher (1993) distinguish “street mathematics” and
“school mathematics”; Sternberg and Wagner (1994) organise the contexts
of cognitive functioning under the titles “academic tasks” and “everyday
tasks”; and Gardner (1991) distinguishes three types of achievements
performed by three types of students (the “intuitive learner”, the
“traditional student”, and the “disciplinary expert”) and describes the gaps
between them.
In our interpretation, inductive reasoning is one of the mental tools that is
used not only to acquire new knowledge but also to make the acquired
knowledge more readily applicable in new contexts. Despite efforts on both
sides, there is still a gap between studies that describe inductive reasoning on
the one hand and those that try to make school learning more meaningful
and knowledge better understood and applied on the other hand. In this
study we relate these two research paradigms by assessing the
developm ental level of inductive reasoning in ve age groups in a school
context and estimating its relationships to some important variables of
school instruction.
To examine the role inductive reasoning plays in present school learning,
we distinguished  two types of performance: (1) “school knowledge”; and (2)
“applicable knowledge” . School knowledge is the type of knowledge that is
mastered at school and is performed in school-related situations, usually in
the same context in which it has been acquired. It is the basis of the usual
assessments (quizzes, tests, exams) carried out at schools, it forms the basis
of grading, and it determines a student’s career within the school system.
Applicable knowledge is the form of knowledge that can be used in
situations other than the one in which it was acquired. We presume that: (1)
school knowledge does not transfer automatically into applicable
knowledge, so those students whose school performance indicators are high
do not necessarily perform well in application tasks; and (2) inductive
reasoning is important in the transfer procedures, so students whose
inductive reasoning is more developed will be better able to apply their
knowledge.
As for the more specic aims of this study, we hypothesise that
higher-order  thinking skills can best be trained when their development  is
still in progress, especially when they are in a fast-growing phase. This
assumption is a generalisation  from the nding of our previous training
programme that operational abilities that were still in their growing phase
could be better modied by training (Csapó, 1992). Through cross-sectional
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TABLE 1
The Samples of the Survey
Boy/Girl Mean Age Mean No. of
Grade n Ratio (%) (yrs) Grades Classes
3 373 46.3/53.7 9.4 4.2 16
5 410 44.3/55.7 11.4 3.8 14
7 290 50.8/49.2 13.5 3.5 12
9 650 47.2/52.8 15.4 3.5 24
11 701 51.8/48.2 17.4 3.4 19
Total 2424 – – – 85
measurements, we outline the developmental tendencies and estimate the
age range when the major phase of developm ent takes place, and we try to
locate those periods where we can expect the best effects from a modied
school instruction. By analysing the relationship between inductive
reasoning and certain other variables of school instruction, we try to decide
what modications of school instruction should be proposed and what
bene ts could be expected from improved instructional practices.
METHODS
Samples
The type of problems studied here did not require composing nationally
representative samples; however, we needed samples that were large
enough to bear the major typical characteristics of schooling. Thus, samples
were drawn from the schools of Szeged (one of the major cities of Hungary)
and its metropolitan area. Whole school classes were chosen for group
testing, and we tried to achieve the best representation of schools in the area
in terms of quality and type of schooling. Other surveys on school
achievement have indicated that the target area of our study did not differ
much from the national norms in terms of school achievements.
The eight-year primary schools (schooling begins at the age of 6 years) use
the same centrally developed curriculum and the same set of textbooks, and
they are fairly homogeneous. There are three types of secondary schools in
Hungary (grammar school or gymnasium, technical school, and vocational
school), and in order to achieve a representative sampling we chose larger
samples in secondary schools (9th and 11th grades). The earliest age when
our tests can be used is the 3rd grade of primary school; below this age we
faced reading difculties. The oldest age group that can be tested within the
educational system is the 11th grade. Between these two points,
measurements took place in the odd-numbered grades. Further data on the
samples are summarised in Table 1.
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TABLE 2
Sample Items of the Inductive Reasoning Tests
Number analogies
14 ® 17 :: 18 ® 21 :: 23 ®
Verbal analogies
CHAIR : FURNITURE 5 DOG : ?
a CAT b A NIMA L c SPANIEL d TABLE e DOGHOUSE
Number series
1 7 13 19 25 31
Letter series
a c e g i k m
Coding
Models: Monday 1 Wednesday 5 Thursday; Tuesday 1 Thursday 5 Saturday
Task: Wednesday 1 Thursday 5
Exclusion
a SCARF b SHOES c HAT d CHAIR e SHIRT f GLOVES
Instruments
Although several tests for inductive reasoning were described in the
literature, we decided to develop new ones. The reason for this decision was
that: (1) verbal tests may translate poorly; and (2) our tests were prepared
for further use in other surveys and training experiments where we need very
sensitive and reliable measurement instruments.
Using the descriptions found in the literature and our experience with
similar tests, we devised a battery of six tests. The number analogies, number
series, letter series, and coding tests consist of open-ended tasks, whereas the
verbal analogies and exclusion tests are composed of multiple-choice items.
Sample items of the inductive reasoning tests are presented in Table 2.
Although we did not devise gural tests, we adapted one of the most
widely used intelligence tests, Raven’s progressive matrices. From previous
measurements we knew that the standard set (SPM) was too easy for the
older age groups, so we composed a new scale by choosing the more difcult
items from the standard set and adding items from the more complex Set II.
The reliability coef cients (Cronbach a ) of the version of tests used in the
present study can be found in Table 3.
To examine various cognitive processes related to inductive reasoning, we
used two tasks, both found in the literature. Wason’s four-card task (Wason,
1968) has been used in several studies; the proportion tasks were described,
for example, by Lawson, Karplus, and Adi (1978). The four-card task can be
considered as a bridge between inductive and deductive reasoning. On the
one hand, it has an explicit solution, which can be found through logical
reasoning. On the other hand, the solution is to nd the cards that can falsify
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TABLE 3
Reliability of Tests used in the Study
Test No. of Items a
Number analogies 14 .92
Verbal analogies 36 .94
Number series 16 .85
Letter series 14 .91
Coding 6 .86
Exclusion 18 .71
Total inductive items 104 .97
Raven 42 .95
a given rule, and falsication or nding a counter example is one of the main
processes of induction. (Or the process, at least in the terms of philosophy, as
Popper, 1972, argued.)
In the proportion task, a picture of two containers with different
diameters was presented, indicating that the water that occupied 4 units in
the wide container occupied 6 units when poured into the narrow one.
Students were asked to estimate how high another quantity of water would
be in the thin container, if it originally occupied 6 units in the wide one.
In this study “school knowledge”  was represented simply by the data
that are most commonly used in the Hungarian schools as an indicator of
overall academic school performance: the means of the grades given by the
teachers (comparable to the Grade Point Average in the United States). It
involves all of the values on which teachers judge their students’ knowledge,
plus the teachers’ subjective perceptions and biases. Teachers may use ve
numeric values to express their judgements with “1” being the worst and “5”
the best grade. These data are used throughout in the school system as a
basic indicator of students’ overall academic performance and they
determine students’ choices in the elementary-to-high school and high
school-to-higher education transitions. The results of the semester
preceding the administration of inductive reasoning tests were used in the
data analysis.
To measure “applicable knowledge”, an applied science test was devised.
The test consisted of 45 questions that required the application of scientic
knowledge in everyday situations. Most of the questions were not directly
discussed in the science courses. Nevertheless, each question could be
answered correctly by applying knowledge learnt in science, but it could not
be answered simply on the basis of everyday experiences. For example:
“Why do we see the ash of lightning rst and hear the sound of thunder only
some time later?” (The reliability of the test: a 5 .90.) This measure was not
as far from school knowledge as real-life applications were (e.g. as far as
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school mathematics is from street mathematics). It measured applicable
knowledge in a school context in a test situation, but it excluded teachers’
subjective judgements, and the test could not be solved by simply recalling
the facts and gures of disciplinary knowledge.
Data Collection
The tests were administered to 7th, 9th, and 11th grade students during the
spring of 1993. When the results showed that the tests were not too difcult
even for the 7th grade students, tests were administered to the 3rd and 5th
grade samples during the spring of 1994. Although the data were collected at
different times, the measurements took place within two years, and we do
not know of any relevant differences between the two testing periods.
Therefore, we analysed the data as if they were the results of simultaneous
cross-sectional measurements. The same procedures of group testing were
applied in each case.
The applied science test was administered during spring 1994 to the
students who had been in our 7th and 11th grade sample in 1993 when the
inductive reasoning tests were given, thus, these students were in the 8th and
12th grade when we tested their science knowledge. Because the vocational
schools end with the 11th grade, in the 12th grade we tested only the students
who attend gymnasium or technical school. This data cannot be considered
as representative for the entire cohort, but rather for the students who
attend schools that make them eligible to enter higher education.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Differences between the Age Groups
In the rst step, we computed the test results as percentages of the maximum
score. The means and standard deviations of the percentage scales are
summarised in Table 4. (In the case of the two tasks, the means indicate the
percentage of students giving the correct solution.) As a general tendency,
larger standard deviations were found in the younger age groups. An
analysis of the frequency distributions showed that this larger variability can
be attributed mainly to a few students in the younger age groups who did
much better than their peers.
The mean achievements of the students of grades 3 through 11 in the two
tasks are depicted in Fig. 1. Only the curve of proportion task is similar to a
regular, logistic-like developm ental curve. The considerable increase in the
percentage of correct answers can be attributed to school instruction,
especially to the mathematics skills acquired during the elementary school
years. The proportion task can be considered one of the simplest forms of
numeric analogies, and similar improvement can be expected in the solution
of numeric analogy tests.
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TABLE 4
The Results of Tasks and Tests in Percentages of the Maximum Score
Grade 3 Grade 5 Grade 7 Grade 9 Grade 11
Tasks/Tests m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) m (SD) m (SD)
Wason 6.3 (24.2) 6.0 (23.7) 7.4 (26.2) 10.1 (30.2) 10.2 (30.3)
Proportion 1.5 (12.1) 7.3 (26.0) 19.9 (40.0) 50.7 (50.0) 62.0 (48.6)
Number analogies 20.9 (23.5) 31.8 (29.2) 63.4 (20.8) 74.4 (17.9) 78.3 (17.2)
Verbal analogies 30.3 (16.4) 41.1 (21.2) 56.0 (23.2) 71.9 (21.3) 75.7 (19.7)
Number series 39.4 (18.2) 46.8 (19.9) 61.1 (20.2) 66.9 (19.9) 71.8 (18.2)
Letter series 45.1 (31.2) 63.1 (30.3) 77.9 (23.3) 85.0 (20.1) 88.5 (18.8)
Coding 31.0 (30.0) 45.6 (34.0) 56.4 (38.3) 69.0 (35.4) 74.4 (32.4)
Exclusion 31.1 (12.5) 39.5 (10.5) 46.1 (11.9) 53.8 (15.2) 58.4 (14.8)
Raven 36.6 (17.9) 52.5 (18.9) 60.3 (18.4) 76.6 (16.6) 81.9 (14.0)
FIG. 1. Differences in the achievements  of the age groups in the Wason and proportion tasks.
The solution of Wason’s task did not show a major improvement over the
eight years covered by the measurements, and the results were hardly better
than random guessing. (The probability of nding the correct solution by
guessing is 6.25%.) This is not surprising, considering the results of
numerous similar studies. However, because the new mathematics curricula
emphasise logical operations, we expected somewhat higher achievements.
This result indicates again the poor transfer and the content-bound nature of
some reasoning skills.
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FIG. 2. Differences in the achievements  of the age groups in the inductive reasoning tests.
For a theoretically better established representation of age-related
differences, we analysed test data by using the procedures of Item Response
Theory (IRT). For each of the six inductive reasoning tests an IRT model
was developed separately. We did the same for the Raven test, and then for
all 104 items, as if they formed one single scale. This method offers a
theoretically less ambiguous solution for summarising the measure of the
developm ental level of inductive reasoning in one single variable. In order to
obtain a simpler and more purposeful scale, we made a linear transformation
on the person parameters: 5 was added to the person parameters (expressed
in logit units), and this sum was multiplied by 100. In this way we devised a
scale on which the test results range approximately from 0 through 1000. (A
similar scale was constructed to represent and compare science
achievements in several countries; see Keeves, 1992.) The differences
between the age groups in the result of inductive reasoning tests
(represented on the scale described) are depicted in Fig. 2.
The curves of Fig. 2 indicate regular developments. Each of them can be
identi ed with a segment of a logistic curve. The greatest differences
between the younger and older samples can be observed in numeric
analogies. In this case, especially in the younger children, not only did the
inductive reasoning skills, which are required to solve numeric analogies
develop rapidly but also their mathematical prerequisites. (See the similar
curve for the proportion task, Fig. 1.) Although the curves run parallel at
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FIG. 3. Differences in the achievements of the age groups in the Raven intelligence and
inductive reasoning tests.
both ends of the covered age range (between the 3rd and 5th grades and the
9th and 11th grades), some of them cross between the 5th and 9th grades.
This middle age range seems to be a period of major structural
reorganisation. The relative positions of achievement on tests with numeric
content and with analogy operations improved similarly, so it is consistent
with these observations that the greatest improvement was found in numeric
analogies. The large age group differences in the numeric and analogical
tasks can mostly be attributed to the inuence of school learning.
The curves of Raven intelligence and inductive reasoning (based on the
person parameters computed from the results of all 104 inductive items) are
separately graphed in Fig. 3. Inductive reasoning showed a regular
developm ental trend. The largest change took place between the 5th and 7th
grades. The turning point, where the accelerating improvement begins to
slow down, can be found near the 6th grade. Furthermore, the curve also
indicates that substantial development  took place before the 3rd grade and
some improvement of inductive reasoning can also be expected after the
11th grade.
Achievements on the Raven test showed minor irregularities in the 5th
and 7th grades. The scores of 5th graders were somewhat higher and those of
7th graders were somewhat lower than could have been expected on the
basis of a single logistic curve model. No specic explanation was found for
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TABLE 5
Correlation of Tasks and Tests
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Wason task
2. Proportion 07
3. Number analogies 07 55
4. Verbal analogies 09 60 67
5. Number series 08 48 62 60
6. Letter series 06 38 58 55 60
7. Coding 11 45 49 52 54 50
8. Exclusion 07 50 57 64 57 51 48
9. Raven 11 56 66 69 61 60 55 60
10. All inductive tasks as test 10 64 82 90 79 75 67 77 78
Note: Decimal points were omitted; N . 2000; correlation coefcients over 0.07 are
signicant at the P , .001 level.
this result. Data were carefully checked and no error was found. Because no
such irregularities were found on other tests, sampling error can also be
excluded, but statistical uctuation may be considered part of the
explanation (see the data in Tables 1 and 4 for computing the standard errors
of measurement). On the other hand, this was the only test with gural
content and this feature could contribute to its unique behaviour. The other
tests indicated a structural reorganisation around this age (as do most
developm ental theories). If we hypothesise a developm ental curve
consisting of two consecutive logistic curves, results in the other
measurement points seem to support such a hypothesis. Nevertheless,
further investigations  are necessary to nd a proper explanation.
Correlations between Tests and Tasks
The correlations between the tasks and tests are presented in Table 5.
Because of the poor results in the solution of Wason’s task, all of its
correlations were very low. The proportion task correlated at the highest
level (.55 and .60) with the two analogy tests, as we also predicted.
The correlations between the tests were usually high, a result which is
comparable with the similar data in the literature. For example, Pellegrino
and Glaser (1982) examined verbal and numerical analogies and the
correlations they found were between .55 and .74. Sternberg and Gardner
(1983) reported somewhat higher correlations between solution times for
analogy, series completion and classication tasks. In our study, in the case
of those pairs of variables where either the inductive procedure (numerical
analogies–verbal analogies, r 5 .67) or the content of tasks (numeric
analogies–number series, r 5 .62, verbal analogies–exclusions, r 5 .64) was
identical, the correlations were somewhat higher than the others.
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TABLE 6
Correlations between the Test Results and School Performance
7/8th grade 11/12th grade
Inductive Raven Grades Inductive Raven Grades
Raven .60 .51
School grades .45 .31 .36 .21
Applied science .49 .36 .37 .46 .36 .22
Correlations were slightly higher with Raven intelligence (ranging from .55
through .69) than the inductive tests correlated with each other. These high
correlations (as well as the even higher Raven—all inductive items
correlation, r 5 .78) empirically support the assumption that the Raven test
can be used to measure the developmental level of inductive reasoning
(besides the theoretical arguments based on the inductive nature of the
progressive matrices). On the other hand, the differences between the
correlations also indicate that specic contents and operations of the tests
also play an important role. Especially in an educational context, the concept
of inductive reasoning may be more useful than the abstract concept of
general intelligence.
Knowledge and Inductive Reasoning
To examine the role inductive reasoning may play in learning, especially in
meaningful learning that results in well understood and applicable
knowledge, we analysed the relationships of inductive reasoning with two
indicators of performance. The correlations of “school knowledge”
(represented by the mean of grades given by teachers), applicable science
knowledge (measured by the applied science test), inductive reasoning and
Raven intelligence are summarised in Table 6. To eliminate age from the
relationships, we separately computed the correlation coefcients for the
7th and the 11th grades. In this way, we can also compare the relationships of
inductive reasoning at these two ages.
It was a consistent result of the previous research that inductive reasoning
highly correlated with academic achievements. Pellegrino and Glaser (1982)
reported high correlation between inductive reasoning tasks and
vocabulary, reading and language tests. Now we may ask, what type of
achievements described in this paper (school knowledge vs. applied
knowledge) is more closely related to inductive reasoning? As we expected,
there were high correlations between inductive reasoning and applied
science knowledge at both ages and there were also signicant (although
weaker) correlations between inductive reasoning and school grades.
Especially in the older age group, inductive reasoning proved to be in a
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closer relationship with the results of the applied science test than did school
grades. Taking into account that the science application test was
administered one year after the inductive reasoning tests and the school
grades data were collected, these correlations mean that those students who
performed better in the inductive tests tended to perform better in the
applied science test a year later. This was also the case with school grades,
but the relationship was stronger with inductive reasoning. In this sense, we
may say that inductive reasoning skills measured at the 7th (11th) grade level
were better predictors of applicable knowledge at the 8th (12th) grade level
than were school grades.
To shape these observations, we developed a regression model with the
applied science test as dependent variable. Regression analyses were carried
out separately in each of the two examined ages in the same way. The
independent variables were simultaneously entered in one single step. The
magnitude of the multiple regression coefcients were similar for the two
age groups (R2 5 0.27 and R2 5 0.24) and approximately one-quarter of the
variance of the applied science test was explained by these three
independent variables. F-tests indicate that the relationship between the
entire set of the independent variables and the dependent variable was
highly signicant (P , .00001) at both ages. As for the beta coefcients, only
that of the Raven for the younger group and school grades for the older
group were not signicant at least at P , .05 level.
The main results of regression analyses are depicted in Fig. 4; the
proportions of variance of dependent variable explained by the independent
variables are indicated in percentages. (Beta coefcients multiplied by the
correlation coefcients and by 100.)
At both ages, approximately 17% of the variance of applicable knowledge
can be attributed to inductive reasoning. This is not a very high proportion in
itself, but it is much higher than that of the other variables. The proportion of
variance explained by “school knowledge” was still signicant at the age of
13 years, but by the end of secondary education it became marginal. Several
other regression models were also computed, including other variables. The
percentages  were somewhat different, but the in uence of inductive
reasoning on the use of science knowledge was usually around twice as high
as that of school knowledge. (For example, when we did not separate the two
age groups, the ratio of variance of applied science test explained by school
grades was 13%, and 21% was explained by inductive reasoning.)
It is also worth observing that the Raven test explained far less variance
than did inductive reasoning. This nding is consistent with the expectation
that specic and concrete mechanisms of thinking are more important in
transferring knowledge than is the more abstract general intelligence. It is
not obvious in this case, however, why the Raven test explained less variance
if it also consisted of inductive reasoning tasks. We explain this difference by
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FIG. 4. Regression model of the effect of inductive reasoning on the application of science
knowledge.
the different operations and content of the Raven test. The more “content-
rich” inductive reasoning tests consisted of tasks with content (words,
numbers, letters) and operations (e.g. analogies) familiar in knowledge
transfer, whereas Raven’s progressive matrices are deliberately as far from
familiar contexts as possible. A comparison of the two charts in Fig. 4 also
indicates that school knowledge and more concrete thinking skills are more
signicant for younger children, whereas abstract thinking skills are
somewhat more important for the older students.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The results support the proposition that inductive reasoning develops during
a broad age range and that the developm ental process covers the whole
period of elementary and secondary education. These results are also
consistent with studies that report successful training experiments at
younger and older ages (Klauer, 1990). Nevertheless, the most rapid
developm ent took place during the elementary school years, so that may be
the most sensitive period. If we take into account the nature of inductive
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reasoning as a means of further learning, the greatest effects could be
expected from programmes that aim at younger age groups.
As far as it can be handled by means of statistics, we have found that
inductive reasoning is essential to the use of knowledge. In education, we
think it more fruitful to use the more easily described concept of inductive
reasoning (or its specic mechanisms, such as analogies) than abstract
concepts, such as intelligence. Studying the more readily identi able specic
mechanisms may result in more substantial ndings for instructional
practice, although the overall concept of inductive reasoning may be useful
for broad statistical analyses.
As for the generalisabili ty of the results, we have no reason to question
that in other cultures we would also nd that inductive reasoning develops
during a long period of life, and that it is signicant in applying knowledge in
new contexts. However, if we take into account that inductive reasoning is
not only a means of learning but also a product of learning, we may conclude
that different educational environments may result in different
developm ental trends. Certain school curricula and educational practices
may result in accelerated developm ent of inductive reasoning, and others
may not provide students with sufcient materials to train their higher-order
thinking skills.
As for Hungarian students, we may nd indicators that seem to support
the proposition that the educational system may train their thinking skills
effectively, as well as indicators that contradict this proposition. On the one
hand, the mathematics and science achievement of Hungarian students is
high when compared to other countries, especially around the age of 14
years (see Keeves, 1992), leading to a conclusion that the learning that
resulted in these achievements trains their reasoning skills as well. On the
other hand, an analysis of school curricula and observation of teaching
practices suggests that Hungarian students are closer to the kind of learners
Gardner (1991) refers to as “disciplinary”.
Our results have also uncovered some problems for further research. For
example, further elaboration of the concepts of school knowledge and
applicable knowledge, especially nding more variables to represent them,
may allow us to develop more sophisticated models for the role of inductive
reasoning. Some of the results of this study cannot be generalised into other
educational contexts, but cross-cultural surveys may reveal general trends
and allow us to identify the effects of specic cultural contexts, especially the
effects of various educational systems, teaching methods, and school
curricula, all of which may moderate development . Cross-national studies of
educational achievement (e.g. the International Association for the
Evaluation of Educational Achievement studies) have indicated several
differences between countries, but they have mostly focused on school
knowledge and mastering school disciplines (e.g. mathematics, science).
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Schooling has other important outcomes as well, such as fostering higher-
order thinking skills, and studying them in other cultures or contexts may not
only highlight the conditions that best help their development , but also the
nature of development .
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